Several researchers have recently documented a large reduction in output volatility. In contrast, this paper examines whether output has become more predictable. Using forecasts from the Federal Reserve Greenbooks, I find the evidence is somewhat mixed. Output seems to have become more predictable at short horizons, but not necessarily at longer horizons.
Introduction
The volatility of the US economy has declined dramatically. The standard deviation of annualized changes in quarterly real seasonally-adjusted GDP declined from 1.2 percentage points in the period 1947-1983 to 0.5 percentage points in 1984-2004. This "Great Moderation" has been described as one of the most striking changes in the business cycle in recent decades (Ben Bernanke, 2004a; James Stock and Mark Watson, 2003) . It is the subject of a large and growing literature, of which Margaret McConnell and Gabriel Perez-Quiros (2000) , Chang Jin Kim and Charles Nelson (1999) , and Olivier Blanchard and John Simon (2001) are prominent examples.
However, what matters to most people is not volatility but uncertainty. Because resources can generally be transferred from known periods of high income to those of low income, predictable variations are not a serious concern. Presumably, it is unpredictable changes that cause large welfare losses. When people cannot accurately predict the future, they make decisions that, with hindsight, turn out to be mistakes.
Firms build factories when they shouldn't. Central banks raise interest rates when they should have lowered them. Resources are wasted taking precautions against events that do not occur. And so on.
The clearest evidence of the importance of uncertainty relative to volatility is the lack of interest in seasonal economic variations. Seasonal variations are huge, accounting for about 85 percent of the variability of output (J. Joseph Beaulieu and Jeffrey A. Miron, 1992, table 1) . But because they are predictable, almost no-one pays attention to them (at a macro-economic level). Even the studies of so-called "volatility" use seasonally-adjusted data. They do not measure the total variation in the data; only the variation not accounted for by one specific influence. But there is no obvious reason for singling out seasonality. Just as predictable seasonal variations are appropriately removed from the data, so should other predictable influences.
If one is interested in unpredictability, one can measure it directly, as the difference between actual outcomes and what people were expecting. There are many available measures of expectations. I use the forecasts of the staff of the Federal Reserve -3 -Board of Governors, as published in a document called the Greenbook. Differences between these forecasts and actual outcomes are the Greenbook errors.
The Greenbook errors provide a good measure of uncertainty for several reasons.
Previous researchers have found that the Greenbook forecasts are more accurate than other forecasts (Christina Romer and David Romer, 2000; Christopher Sims, 2002) . So they can be taken as representing the state-of-the-art or the envelope of predictability.
Furthermore, the data on Greenbook forecasts is richer than for many private sector forecasts. The forecast horizon is longer and the data extend further back in time. 1 Trends in the Greenbook errors are also interesting because of their relevance to monetary policy. As Chairman Alan Greenspan (2004, p. 8) has noted, "the success of monetary policy depends importantly on the quality of forecasting". So, from a historical perspective, changes in the quality of the forecasts might help explain changes in policy performance, to the extent that policy was guided by the staff forecasts. From a normative perspective, the accuracy of forecasts and its stability help determine the extent to which monetary policy should be "forward-looking". Lastly, if the forecast errors are stable over time then the monetary policy environment can be described as one of "risk" rather than "Knightian uncertainty". That is, we can quantify what we do not know. In particular, the distribution of outcomes about previous forecasts would provide a reliable guide to the distribution of possible outcomes about the current forecast. This is relevant both to the FOMC's assessment of risks, and (more so in other countries than in the US) the public presentation of policy.
Although the paper is indirectly motivated by these monetary policy issues, its primary focus is whether uncertainty has declined. I find that there has been a clear and large reduction in uncertainty at short horizons, but not necessarily at longer horizons. I also find that the reduction in uncertainty is much less than the reduction in volatility.
Closely associated with this, recent forecasts have had remarkably little predictive power. 
II. Related literature
The view that unpredictability is of greater interest than volatility is not new. As noted above, almost all of the studies of volatility remove predictable seasonal influences from the data. Many others remove the predictions of a vector autoregression. Several papers in this literature -for example, Stock and Watson (2003) -explicitly discuss unpredictability.
However, insofar as measures of uncertainty are presented, it is typically in the form of the errors of an econometric model. After-the-event regression residuals are easier to compile than real-time forecast errors, and they facilitate decomposition and analysis. But otherwise, they provide an unsatisfactory measure of the uncertainty that faced decision makers in real time. On the one hand, they understate real-time uncertainty because regressions are estimated after the event and so benefit from hindsight. For example, they "know" the sample mean (unless estimated recursively) and data revisions (unless real time data is used). Unavoidably, their specifications reflect information that was unavailable to forecasters. On the other hand, they tend to overstate uncertainty because they are simple. Even the most complicated econometric models incorporate much less information than the Greenbook forecast, which reflects the pooling of many variables, models, and statistical methods by a large team of economists.
Previous comparisons suggest that the second of these biases has usually been more important. The Greenbook and private sector forecasts have been much more accurate (over a limited range of measures) than autoregressions, and slightly more accurate than large econometric models, such as MPS.
2 That is, autoregressions have tended to overstate uncertainty.
-5 -Several recent papers have analyzed real-time forecast errors, including Scott Schuh (2001 ), Charles Goodhart (2004 ), and Sean Campbell (2004 . Schuh and Goodhart find some similar results to mine, using different data sets, which I note below. However, neither of these papers is directly focused on changes in the errors over time.
Campbell's work, circulated while this paper was in preparation, overlaps to a greater extent. We both find that short-horizon forecast errors have narrowed by less than the decline in output volatility. However, Campbell's focus is on differences between private sector forecasts and autoregressions, rather than assessing whether uncertainty has changed. Also, his data comes from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), Romer and Romer (2000) , Robertson and Tallman (1998) and several references cited by Schuh (2001, n.14) . Forecast errors are simply the difference between the forecast and outcomes. For illustration, chart 3 shows eight-quarter errors. Note that they have tended to grow larger over time, with the errors made over the most recent business cycle being especially bad.
I discuss this point further below.
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IV. Changes in Predictability
The main results in this paper are presented in charts 4, 5, and 6. Each chart shows two The variances and MSEs shown in the charts are algebraically related. Let y t represent actual output growth in quarter t and f t its forecast. The forecast error is then e t = y t -f t . I use the same real-time measure of y t in both the MSE and the variance.
Rearranging, subtracting the sample mean y from each side, squaring and averaging over n quarters (n = 20 for a five-year window), gives:
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The distance between the two lines in each chart equals the sum of the last two terms in the equation. Loosely speaking, this can be called the predictable component of output growth. Strictly speaking, this requires that the covariance be small, which is not always the case. This is in contrast to after-the-event econometric analysis, where the event y is known before its prediction f. Then error-minimization means the covariance of predictions and errors is zero (otherwise, errors could be reduced by changing the prediction). But when f is determined before y, as in forecasting, the forecast does not minimize errors (though it tries to) and the covariance need not equal zero.
There are four key points evident in charts 4, 5, and 6. These are examined in more detail in subsequent sections:
1) As the literature on the Great Moderation has documented, the variance of output growth declines substantially, in the sense that it has been much smaller in the last two decades than it was in the previous two decades.
2) In contrast, the trend in unpredictability is less clear. Although mean squared prediction errors of short-horizon forecasts tend to be larger before the early 1980s than after, the change is not as large or obvious as for the variance, and is more sensitive to timing. Moreover, the eight-quarter forecast errors seem to trend up, albeit over a shorter sample period. Much of the literature on volatility (with several exceptions) has focused on changes at a quarterly frequency. Previous analyses of Greenbook forecasts (for example, Romer and Romer, 2000, or Sims, 2002) have also tended to emphasize quarterly changes at different horizons (the three-quarter ahead forecast of quarterly GDP growth, the four-quarter ahead forecast of quarterly GDP growth … and so on). Chart 4, which shows quarterly changes and errors, is included to permit comparisons with this research and because of its slightly longer span of data.
However, measurement at this frequency places equal weight on transient and persistent errors. But an error that is reversed the following quarter is less important than one that is sustained. Accordingly, the cumulative sum of errors over multiple quarters, shown in charts 5 and 6, is more interesting for most purposes. For example, it is more closely related to intermediate objectives of monetary policy, such as the level of the output gap. Moreover, the much greater magnitude of longer horizon errors can be seen from the scaling of the vertical axes of the charts. Focusing on errors beyond the current quarter also reflects the perspective of central bankers. Bernanke (2004b, p4) and Goodhart (2004, p5) suggest that many monetary policy decisions are based on the inflation outlook 7 to 8 quarters ahead. 5 However, one limitation of the longer-horizon forecasts is that they are available for a shorter sample, as noted above. Another limitation is that they overlap more, so provide fewer independent observations for testing hypotheses.
-13 -A detailed analysis of inflation uncertainty is outside the scope of this paper.
Nevertheless, chart 7 shows 4-quarter changes and errors for the GNP/GDP deflator, for comparison. The inflation story is somewhat different from that for output in several respects. A reduction in uncertainty is clearer. And the outlier of 1974 (discussed in section VIII) has a greater effect. Notwithstanding these differences, points 1, 3, and 4 above apply to inflation as well as to output. But a simple comparison of errors at the beginning and end of the sample may be misleading. These observations may not be representative of overall performance. For a more comprehensive assessment of longer term changes, I examine whether uncertainty declined after 1984. Several papers have concluded that a discrete break in output volatility occurred about then, so a natural question is whether there was a similar break in uncertainty. Of course, this is just one of many possible ways that instability in the -14 -errors could be measured. One could also look for deterministic or stochastic trends or a discrete change at other, possibly unknown, breakpoints. At first glance, a deterministic trend would seem to provide a poor description of the MSE series in charts 4, 5 and 6.
Examination of other alternatives would require more detailed analysis. The assumption that errors are unbiased seems a reasonable approximation. Over different horizons, the smallest p-value for a two-tailed t-test of the hypothesis that the mean error is zero is 13 percent (for seven-quarter errors). And even if bias were to become evident in a small sample, the staff would presumably react to remove it from the population.
A more serious concern is that forecast errors are not normally distributed. For example, the four-quarter errors fail a Jarque-Bera test for normality with a p-value of less than 0.0001 percent. This matters because, with a fat-tailed distribution, a reduction in measured uncertainty might simply reflect some large outliers fortuitously falling before the breakpoint, rather than after. However, the non-normality of the forecast errors can largely be attributed to their overlapping nature, which means that unusually large errors, such as 1974, tend to be repeated more often than would normally occur.
The residuals from modeling the 4-quarter errors as an MA(3) process (discussed below) have a Jarque-Bera p-value of 3 percent. This suggests that, once serial correlation is removed, the errors are approximately normal. Nevertheless, as I discuss in Section VIII, removing the outliers of 1974 from my sample weakens the evidence of a reduction in uncertainty.
The main difficulty with conducting F-tests is that they require that the errors be independent. For a forecast with a horizon of h quarters, the outcome becomes known (by assumption) in h + 2 quarters. If forecasts are efficient, that error will be -16 -uncorrelated with the errors in following forecasts. However, because the forecast horizon exceeds the frequency of observation, the forecasts overlap, and these overlapping forecasts will be correlated: a surprise that causes an error for one forecast will also contribute to errors for all forecasts already made but for which the data are yet to be realized. Accordingly the Greenbook errors could, in principle, have a MA (h+1) structure.
In practice, the errors can reasonably be described as only MA(h-1). Although the previous quarter's error is not exactly known when the current quarter is being forecast, it seems that that information would not actually be helpful. The h'th coefficient in moving average regressions is typically near zero. For example, the correlation of current-quarter forecast errors with their one-quarter lag is only 0.02. So for current-quarter forecasts, serial correlation can be ignored. For multi-quarter forecasts, it is only the overlap of the events that needs to be controlled for, not the overlap of the forecasts.
6
Serial correlation can be dealt with in different ways. In the Appendix, I use a sample of non-overlapping errors. Non-overlapping errors are simple to construct and interpret, and provide a test statistic with a distribution that is both standard and exact.
Accordingly, they provide a natural "first cut" at the data. However, this approach involves disregarding a lot of relevant information. Surprisingly perhaps, much more powerful tests can be constructed by Monte Carlo.
Specifically, I estimate an MA(h-1) model for each horizon of errors over the longest continuous sample available. I then use these estimated coefficients, together with random draws from a standard normal distribution, to construct a sequence of moving averages. I then impose the same frequency of missing observations as my sample and draw a sub-sequence that has the same timing and size as my forecast errors.
-17 -I then take the ratio of the mean square of these artificial errors, before and after 1984q1.
I store that ratio and repeat 100,000 times. This is about 80 times larger than the p-value estimated by the variance-ratio tests above.
Similarly, Newey-West t-statistics on dummies in regressions for multi-quarter forecasts also have much higher p-values than those in table 1. Using absolute errors, instead of squared errors, results in even larger differences. Because, given their assumptions, the variance-ratio tests are exact, this implies that the regression approach lacks power. The reason is that the residuals, being squared errors, have a highly skewed distribution, approximately χ 2 (1). Whereas variance-ratio tests reflect this, conventional least squares inference assumes incorrectly that the residuals are normally distributed. This turns out 7 One complication in this approach is that beyond a horizon of six quarters, long continuous series of errors are not available, which makes estimation of moving average models difficult. However, regression coefficients tend to increase approximately linearly as the horizon of errors and the order of the moving average expand. Accordingly, it seems reasonable to extrapolate coefficients for the seven and eight quarter errors, based on the coefficients from other regressions. The results are not sensitive to how this is done, partly because significance levels at these horizons are far from marginal. Indeed, overall the results are not sensitive to most specification choices. For example, varying the estimation period, using higher-order moving average models, or not using backcasting can change individual coefficients, but leaves overall results little changed. When extreme parameter values are chosen, for example setting the moving average coefficients to zero (assuming independence) or to 2, the quantitative results change, but qualitative results are fairly similar.
-18 -to be a very poor approximation. One implication of this is that simple modifications of regressions, such as Andrews-Ploberger tests for instability at unknown dates, would also give distorted results. To assess the statistical significance of these differences, I repeat the Monte Carlo exercise of table 1. However, in place of a null hypothesis that the variance is stable, I now test the hypothesis that it falls by as much as the variance of output growth. That is, after allocating initial draws of random numbers to a quarter, I multiply those after 1984 by the square root of the variance ratios in table 2. Then, as before, I compare actual MSE ratios with the distribution of artificial ratios of mean squared moving averages, but this time using a right-tailed test. As the final column of table 2 shows, p-values from this experiment tend to be significant. One can reject the hypothesis that uncertainty has fallen by as much as the reduction in volatility. 9 Perhaps for this reason, McConnell and Perez-Quiros bootstrap their Andrews-Ploberger tests. However the bootstrap is harder to apply to my data set, because it is serially correlated and the frequency of observation increases over time. If one simply took draws at regular intervals, the results would be similar to those for the non-overlapping sample, discussed in the Appendix.
-19 - The greater reduction in volatility than in uncertainty corresponds to the dramatic decline in the predictable component of output variations, shown in the earlier charts.
The reasons for this decline are not clear but are an interesting subject for speculation.
One possibility is that early fluctuations were heavily influenced by changes in monetary policy, the effects of which were relatively predictable.
VII. Recent forecasts have been bad
One surprising feature of Charts 3 and 6 is that eight-quarter errors have tended to increase over the last two decades. Although not shown, a similar trend is evident, though not as marked, in six-quarter and seven-quarter errors.
This may be relevant to historical assessments of monetary policy. A greater concern than the trends in unpredictability is the observation that, since the late 1980s, mean squared prediction errors have been similar to, and sometimes greater than, the variance. Put another way, the sample mean has provided a more accurate guide to GDP growth than the actual forecasts. So, given the mean, the forecast can be characterized as uninformative or even misleading. It can also be characterized as having a zero or negative R 2 .
To illustrate the point slightly differently, consider a regression of the two-year change in GDP (the solid line in chart 2) on a constant and the corresponding forecast (the dots in chart 2). This regression generates a negative coefficient on the forecast when estimated over the last decade of my sample (from 1992 through 2001) . So when the staff predicted that output growth was likely to be high, it actually tended to be low; when the prediction was low, actual growth tended to be high.
This experience is not confined to the performance of the Federal Reserve staff. Campbell (2004, p.9) finds that short-term output forecasts of the Survey of Professional
Forecasters also have a negative R 2 over the period 1984 -2003 . Goodhart (2004 reports negative coefficients on most of the Bank of England's longer-horizon output forecasts for 1998 to 2003.
The disappearance of the predictable component of real GDP growth seems to contradict the finding by Blanchard and Simon (2001) , Stephen Cecchetti et. al. (2005) , and others, that there has not been a change in the dynamics of US output. Reasons for this difference are not clear. Perhaps it is the use of hindsight or revised data. Or -21 -perhaps simple autoregressions, such as those used in these studies, lack the power to detect important structural changes.
The disappearance of the predictable component of real GDP growth also has implications for the debate over whether monetary policy should be guided by simple feedback rules or whether it should be based on economic forecasts. For a survey of this debate, see Bernanke (2004) . Advocates of feedback rules (sometimes called "backwardlooking" policy) suggest that forecasts are unreliable and give rise to over-confidence and hence policy errors. In contrast, proponents of "forward-looking" policy argue that we have some ability to forecast the economy, and that this information is useful. The evidence from the 1990s offers more support to the advocates of feedback rules than to those of forecast-based policies.
The poor recent performance highlights a danger in "forward-looking" policies.
However, it is not typical. When estimated over the full sample for which two-year forecast errors are available (that is, 1980-2001) , the Mean Squared Error of eight-quarter forecasts (7.9) is appreciably smaller than the variance of eight-quarter output growth (9.7). Calculations for shorter-horizon forecasts, extending further back in time, show larger differences. Similarly, when the regression noted four paragraphs above is estimated over the 1980-2001 period, the forecast has a coefficient of 0.95 (with NeweyWest standard error 0.25), which is correctly signed and not statistically or economically different from one. So, over larger samples, the forecast seems to have been a useful guide, on average. The poor recent performance may simply represent a run of bad luck.
Recent forecasts have been bad both relative to history and in the sense that they have had a negative correlation with actual outcomes. However, it does not necessarily follow from this that the Fed staff should have done better. In comparing MSEs with variances, one is implicitly using the sample mean as a benchmark. This approach is appropriate for many purposes, but it does not represent a forecasting rule that was available when the forecasts were made. To address this, chart 8 reproduces the information from chart 6, together with a thin solid line labeled "variance about presample mean". This line shows the squared deviation of output growth over the 
VIII. The Outliers of 1974
In May 1974, the staff forecast that GNP would grow 1.8 percent in the four quarters to 1975q1. In the event, it fell 6.1 percent. This 7.9 percentage point error is 4.2 times as large as the standard deviation of four-quarter errors. In a large sample of normally distributed errors, such an extreme event would happen once every 34,000 observations. So the reduction in uncertainty does not just reflect the accident that the "perfect storm" of 1974 happened to fall before the breakpoint.
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IX. Conclusion
The Greenbook short-horizon forecast errors are smaller after 1984. In that sense, uncertainty has diminished. However, this reduction was significantly smaller than the reduction in output volatility. Moreover, longer-horizon errors, which are more important for some purposes, do not seem to have narrowed.
This paper has attempted to document how the unpredictability of output has changed over recent decades. It has not directly addressed the questions of why the Fed staff made the errors it did, how decision-makers should react to that unpredictability, nor how that unpredictability might be reduced. These are topics for future research.
Hopefully, the results in this paper may contribute to their analysis.
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Appendix: Non-overlapping errors
A simple method of removing serial correlation from forecast errors is to construct a sample of non-overlapping errors -or, more precisely, forecasts of nonoverlapping events. This sample comprises all current-quarter forecasts, every second 2-quarter forecast, every third three-quarter forecast, and so on. This approach also has the advantage that it provides an equal weighting to periods with frequent repetitive forecasts relative to periods when forecasts were less frequent. Table 4 shows forecast MSEs before and after 1984q1 using this sample. These are broadly similar to those shown in table 1. The main difference is that six-quarter and seven-quarter MSEs are noticeably larger after 1984 than before. This partly reflects the re-weighting, but mainly seems attributable to sampling variability. Assuming that the non-overlapping errors are independent, the ratio of these MSEs has an exact F distribution, with degrees of freedom parameters equal to the number of errors in each sub-sample.
P-values from F-tests are shown in the final column. Note that the p-value for current quarter forecasts, which use all observations and assume no serial correlation, is about the same as that in table 1 estimated by Monte Carlo, as would be expected. Other p-values are much higher than those in table 1. These tests do not clearly reject the hypothesis that the variance of errors is stable. However, because these tests involve disregarding a great deal of relevant information, it is arguable that this failure to reject is uninformative.
-26 - (c) probability of a ratio smaller than that observed, under the null hypothesis that variances are equal. Specifically, the tail of an F-distribution to the left of the given ratio, with degrees of freedom given by the number of non-overlapping observations shown.
